Gambler's fallacy

I was listening to ESPN First Take on Monday (podcast [mp3]) and the hosts were debating whether the Falcons should have punted or not on fourth and short in overtime against the Saints. In wrapping up the debate, Jay Crawford said (around minute 32 of the podcast):

"One thing on your [Jon Ritchie's] numbers deal, because I'm a math guy too. They [the Falcons] have gone for it twice earlier, similar situation, you said that there is a 66.1% probability [sic] of picking it up ... Here's why you don't go for it: they've tried it twice, they've made it twice [earlier in the game], it's probability. Because if you're sitting at a blackjack table and you're playing odds, you're playing three times, and the law of your averages tells you, it's simple math if you try it three times you're going to make it twice and miss it once, and that's exactly how it played out."

Jay then apologizes to Skip Bayless, I guess for being too "mathy". He should be sorry not for using math, but for using math poorly.

Rant of the Week (ROTW): Trusted vs. Trustworthy

A common theme in computer security is "trust" -- and the implication that trust is equal to security is prevalent in quite a bit of literature and propaganda.  Although Wikipedia isn't the greatest source, it does provide some insight into popular beliefs, and makes for a good vehicle for this discussion.  Consider the article on the Trusted Platform Module, which starts with:

In computing, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is both the name of a published specification detailing a secure cryptoprocessor that can store cryptographic keys that protect information, as well as the general name of implementations of that specification, often called the "TPM chip" or "TPM Security Device"

So what? Follow the links, and we get a little closer to some understanding:

A secure cryptoprocessor is a dedicated computer on a chip or microprocessor for carrying out cryptographic operations, embedded in a packaging with multiple physical security measures, which give it a degree of tamper resistance.